We consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. First, we characterize the unique equilibrium outcome in the first price auction for any values of parameters. Then we compare the first price auction with the second price auction in terms of expected revenue. Under the assumption that the probabilities of low values are the same for the two bidders, we obtain two main results: (i) the second price auction yields a higher revenue unless the distribution of a bidder's valuation first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the other bidder's valuation "in a strong sense" and (ii) introducing reserve prices implies that the first price auction is never superior to the second price auction. In addition, in some cases, the revenue in the first price auction decreases when all the valuations increase.
Introduction
This article is about a seller's preferences between a first price auction (FPA) and a second price/Vickrey auction (SPA) when the bidders' valuations are independently but asymmetrically distributed. Precisely, we consider a setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. In this environment, we first derive the unique equilibrium outcome and the expected revenue in the FPA for all parameter values. Then we compare the revenue in the FPA with the revenue in the SPA. To this purpose, we restrict to the case in which the probability of a low value for bidder 1 is equal to the probability of a low value for bidder 2, and we prove that the SPA often yields a higher revenue than the FPA, although the opposite result is common in the literature on asymmetric auctions (we provide an overview of this literature later on in this Introduction). For instance, on the basis of numeric analysis for some classes of continuous distributions, Li and Riley (2007) claim that "the 'typical' case leads to greater expected revenue in the sealed high-bid auction" [i.e., in the FPA]; a similar point of view is found in Klemperer (1999) .
More in detail, we obtain the following results. -The revenue in the FPA may decrease when all the valuations increase, because increasing the high value of one bidder may induce his opponent to bid less aggressively. This makes the FPA inferior to the SPA.
1
-The SPA is more profitable than the FPA for the seller if a bidder's valuation is more variable than the other bidder's valuation, or if the distribution of a bidder's valuation first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of his opponent's valuation -but not too strongly. Conversely, the FPA is superior to the SPA if the low value of a bidder is sufficiently larger than the high value of the other bidder.
2
-Allowing the seller to use a reserve price makes the comparison between the FPA and the SPA clear cut: The FPA with the optimal reserve price is never superior to the SPA with the optimal reserve price.
3
In the rest of this Introduction, we provide an overview of the related literature. In Section 2, we describe the primitives of our model. In Section 3, we study equilibrium behavior in the SPA and in the FPA. In Section 4, we present our results on the comparison between the FPA and the SPA, 4 and we propose an explanation for why some results obtained for continuously distributed values do not hold in the case of discrete distributions. In Section 5, we 1 This result contrasts with a claim in Maskin and Riley (1985) for the case in which the only deviation from a symmetric setting is given by unequal high valuations [this claim is reproduced in Klemperer (1999) ]. However, for this case, Maskin and Riley (1983) agree with our ranking between the FPA and the SPA. 2 In fact, the latter result is known, and in more general settings, since Maskin and Riley (2000a) . 3 As we mentioned above, these results hold if the probability of a low value is the same for each bidder. In Doni and Menicucci (2012a) , we study the case in which the probabilities of a low value for the two bidders are different. We also partially extend our results to a setting in which each bidder's valuation has a three-point support.
4 Doni and Menicucci (2012b) study a procurement setting in which the auctioneer privately observes the qualities of the products offered by the suppliers and needs to decide how much of the own information on qualities should be revealed to suppliers before a (first score) auction is held. Our results on the comparison between the FPA and the SPA contribute to determine the best information revelation policy for the auctioneer.
examine two extensions of the baseline model. The appendix provides the proofs of our results.
Related literature
The analysis of the FPA when the bidders' valuations are asymmetrically and continuously distributed is often difficult because the equilibrium bidding strategies are characterized by a system of differential equations (obtained from the first-order condition for each type of bidder) which has a closed form solution only in very particular cases. For instance, Kaplan and Zamir (2012) derive the (inverse) equilibrium bidding functions under asymmetrically and uniformly distributed valuations; Plum (1992) and Cheng (2006) obtain closed form solutions for some special cases of power distributions. 5 Not surprisingly, matters are simpler if there are only two types for each bidder, rather than a continuum. In such a case, Maskin and Riley (1983) derive in closed form an equilibrium in mixed strategies, assuming that the bidders' low values are equal. 6 Our Proposition 1 extends this result, as we remove the assumption that the bidders' low valuations coincide.
As it is well known, with asymmetric distributions the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply, and the lack of a closed form for the equilibrium bidding functions complicates the comparison between the FPA and the SPA. One interesting result is provided by Fibich, Gavious, and Sela (2004) (see also Fibich and Gavious (2003) and Lebrun (2009) ) for a setting in which valuations are continuously distributed with a common support. They prove that if the c.d.f.s for the valuations are slightly asymmetric, with ε representing the degree of asymmetry, then the revenue difference between the FPA and the SPA is of the second order in ε. Therefore, the FPA and the SPA are approximately revenue equivalent when the asymmetry is weak. This contributes to explain why the general ranking problem is not yet well understood, and why there is not a general dominance of an auction format over the other.
Precisely, it is known that the seller prefers the SPA in some specific settings. For instance, Vickrey (1961) examines a setting in which a bidder's valuation is common knowledge and the other bidder's value is uniformly distributed. The SPA dominates the FPA if the commonly known value is low enough. Maskin and Riley (2000a) consider the case in which a bidder's distribution is obtained from the other bidder's distribution by reallocating some probability mass to the lower end-point. They prove that the SPA is superior if the initial distribution has an increasing hazard rate. In the binary setting with equal low values, Maskin and Riley (1983) show that the SPA is better than the FPA if the bidders' high values are approximately equal, or if the probabilities of a high value are approximately equal. Gavious and Minchuk (2013) study environments such that the valuations' distributions are close to the uniform distribution and in this framework they identify cases in which the SPA dominates the FPA.
On the other hand, there exist results which establish the superiority of the FPA somewhat beyond particular examples, although these results are still limited compared to the general problem. Precisely, Kirkegaard (2012a) analyzes a setting with continuously distributed valuations and provides sufficient conditions for the FPA to dominate the SPA. Kirkegaard (2012b) uses the main result in Kirkegaard (2012a) to identify robust classes of environments in which the FPA is superior to the SPA. In particular, this occurs if a bidder's valuation distribution satisfies suitable curvature conditions and the other bidder's valuation distribution is obtained by shifting to the left, or truncating, the first bidder's distribution, or if it lies between these two benchmarks in the sense of a stochastic order called dispersive order. These results are of interest because (i) they considerably extend some results in Maskin and Riley (2000a) and (ii) they are obtained using standard mechanism design techniques, rather than by examining the properties of the system of differential equations which characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies (this often provides modest economic insights). In Section 4.3, we describe the approach in Kirkegaard (2012a) and explain why it does not apply to any environment which is close to our discrete setting.
We compare the FPA with the SPA in the binary setting assuming that the probability of a low value is the same for each bidder. We prove that in this case, the FPA dominates the SPA only if the distribution of a bidder's valuation firstorder stochastically dominates the distribution of the other bidder's valuation "in a strong sense" (but even in this case, introducing reserve prices destroys the advantage of the FPA). For instance, for a not too large distribution shift the SPA is superior to the FPA, unlike in Kirkegaard (2012a).
The model
A (female) seller owns an indivisible object which is worthless to her and faces two (male) bidders. Let v 1 (v 2 ) denote the monetary valuation for the object of bidder 1 (bidder 2), which he privately observes; v 1 and v 2 are independently distributed. The set v 1L ; v 1H f g is the support for v 1 , with 0 < v 1L < v 1H and λ 1 ; Pr v 1 ¼ v 1L f g2 ð0; 1Þ. Likewise, the support for v 2 is v 2L ; v 2H f g with 0 < v 2L < v 2H and λ 2 ; Pr v 2 ¼ v 2L f g2ð 0; 1Þ. Without loss of generality, we assume that v 1L v 2L . Both the seller and bidders are risk neutral, and a bidder's utility if he wins is given by his valuation for the object minus the price paid to the seller; his utility if he loses is zero. We use i j to denote bidder i when his valuation is v ij , thus for instance 2 L is the type of bidder 2 with valuation v 2L .
The main purpose of this article is to evaluate the relative profitability of the FPA and the SPA for the seller. In either of these auctions, each bidder submits simultaneously a nonnegative sealed bid, and the bidder who makes the highest bid wins the object (if the bidders tie, the winner is selected according to a specified tie-breaking rule: see next section). In the FPA, the winning bidder pays the own bid; in the SPA, he pays the loser's bid (i.e., the second highest bid).
3 Equilibrium bidding 3.1 SPA It is well known that when bidders have private values, in the SPA it is weakly dominant for each bidder to bid the own valuation. Thus the seller's expected revenue R S is the expectation of minfv 1 ; v 2 g, which is straightforward to evaluate:
For future reference, we denote with A the region of valuations such that
, and with C the region such that v 1L < v 1H < v 2L < v 2H . Notice that R S does not depend on v 2H in regions B and C and does not depend on v 2L in region C.
FPA
The analysis for the FPA is less immediate than for the SPA. In fact, finding the closed form for the equilibrium bidding strategies for an FPA with asymmetrically distributed valuations is often impossible when valuations are continuously distributed. However, this is not the case given our assumptions on the distributions of v 1 and v 2 (we consider equilibria in which no type of bidder bids above the own valuation). We typically find a mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE), but before describing it we consider a benchmark symmetric environment.
The benchmark symmetric setting
Suppose that v 1 and v 2 are symmetrically distributed such that
We know from Maskin and Riley (1985) 
(which is also equal to R S ).
The equilibrium for the asymmetric setting
For the setting with asymmetrically distributed v 1 ; v 2 described by Section 2, we find that often no pure-strategy BNE exists [the exception occurs when condition [3] below is satisfied], and sometimes no mixed-strategy BNE exists either. Precisely, when v 1L ¼ v 2L we find that no BNE exists in the standard FPA in which each bidder wins with probability 1 2 in case of tie [for more details see the proof to Proposition 1 in Doni and Menicucci (2012a) . However, Proposition 2 in Maskin and Riley (2000b) establishes that a BNE exists under a suitable tiebreaking rule such that each bidder i is required to submit both an "ordinary" bid b i ! 0 and a "tie-breaker" bid c i ! 0. Lebrun (2002) , in the auction he denotes with F PA.
"Vickrey tie-breaking rule", for a bidder i with valuation v i submitting an ordinary bid b i , it is weakly dominant to choose c i ¼ v i À b i . Given this property for tie-breaking bids, when we describe a strategy of bidder i we implicitly assume that to each ordinary bid b i is associated a tie-breaking bid c i equal to v i À b i . Therefore, whenever a tie occurs the bidder with the highest valuation wins and pays the valuation of the other bidder. We want to stress that this particular tie-breaking rule is needed only when v 1L ¼ v 2L , since existence is obtained for any tie-breaking rule if v 1L Þ v 2L . Precisely, when v 1L < v 2L we find that multiple BNE exist regardless of the tie-breaking rule, but they are all outcome equivalent (see for instance Proposition 1(i)); therefore multiplicity is not an issue.
In the BNE described by Proposition 1(ii) below an important role is played by two specific bidsb and b such thatb is the smaller solution to the following quadratic equation (in the unknown b):
Precisely,b is the highest bid in the support of the mixed strategy of type 2 L , and b is the highest bid in the support of the mixed strategies of types 1 H and 2 H . The values ofb and b are determined in such a way that the bidders' mixed strategies have no mass point at bids larger than v 1L , a necessary condition for equilibrium. The assumption [4] in Proposition 1(ii) implies thatb satisfies v 1L b < minfv 2L ; v 1H g.
Proposition 1
Given v 1L v 2L , consider the FPA with the Vickrey tie-breaking rule. Although multiple BNE may exist, they are all outcome equivalent to the following BNE.
Type 1 L always bids v 1L and the bids of the other types depend on the parameters as follows:
then types 2 L ; 2 H bid v 1H ; type 1 H bids weakly less than v 1H with probability one and in such a way that no type of bidder 2 has incentive to bid below v 1H .
(ii) If 
then 2 L bids v 1L and 1 H ; 2 H play mixed strategies with a common support ½v 1L ; λ 1 v 1L þ ð1 À λ 1 Þv 2H and the following c.d.f.s, for 1 H ; 2 H respectively:
½8
We discuss separately the three results in Proposition 1. 
In a setting with continuously distributed valuations, Maskin and Riley (2000a) identify an analogous BNE and provide the intuition we describe here and after Proposition 2. In addition, Maskin and Riley (1983) than v 1H , which implies that each type of bidder 2 has so much to gain from winning that it is profitable for him to make a bid of v 1H in order to outbid each type of bidder 1. Precisely, [3] guarantees that type 2 L (and thus type 2 H as well) prefers winning for sure by bidding v 1H rather than bidding v 1L and winning only when facing type 1 L , that is with probability λ 1 .
Case (ii) In the opposite case in which v 1H is large, [3] is violated and 2 L is not very aggressive since he prefers to bid v 1L and win only against 1 L rather than bidding v 1H and winning against both 1 L and 1 H , as the latter alternative is too expensive. Indeed, 2 L bids in the interval ½v 1L ;b, withb < v 1H , and with an atom
This less aggressive bidding of 2 L allows 1 H to win with positive probability by bidding in ðv 1L ;b, which makes his equilibrium payoff positive. This implies that the highest bid of 1 H is smaller than v 1H , since each bid in the support of a bidder's mixed strategy needs to maximize the expected payoff of the bidder given the other types' strategies. Therefore also the highest bid of 2 H is smaller than v 1H , as we see from Proposition 1(ii). As v 1H increases, 2 L becomes increasingly less aggressive:b decreases and G 2L ðbÞ increases for any b 2 ½v 1L ;bÞ. This occurs because as v 1H increases, the equilibrium payoff of 1 H increases and in order to satisfy the condition of constant payoff of 1 H for bids in ðv 1L ; b, G 2L needs to put more weight on v 1L and to become flatter in ðv 1L ; b.
Case (iii) When v 1H is large enough such that [7] is satisfied, type 2 L bids v 1L with certainty and 2 H bids v 1L with positive probability. In particular, the larger is v 1H , the less aggressive 2 H becomes, giving higher probability to bids close to v 1L . We remark that [7] holds for a large λ 1 , and thus for a large λ 1 type 2 L bids v 1L with probability one, type 2 H bids v 1L with positive probability. This occurs because a large λ 1 gives an incentive to bidder 2 to bid b ¼ v 1L , as this (low) bid allows him to win against type 1 L , which arises with probability λ 1 . Finally, notice that when [7] holds, the equilibrium strategies -and thus the expected revenuedo not depend on v 2L .
A well-known feature of the FPA when valuations are asymmetrically distributed is that an inefficient allocation of the object occurs with positive probability. In our setting, suppose for instance that v 1L < v 2L Þv 1H and [4] holds.
Thenb > v 1L and in the state of the world with types 1 H ; 2 L each type wins with positive probability; thus, the highest valuation bidder may not win.
Comparison between the FPA and the SPA
In order to derive the seller's preferences between the FPA and the SPA, we need to evaluate the expected revenue R F in the FPA generated by the BNE described in Proposition 1. Although we can express R F in closed form (see section "Derivation of R F given the BNE described by Proposition 1" in the appendix), the inefficiency of the FPA we mentioned above makes R F a compli- 
The case in which [3] is satisfied
When [3] holds, we obtain the simple result described by next proposition. As we mentioned in footnote 2, a similar result is found in Maskin and Riley (2000a) and holds under very general assumptions on the distributions, provided that the lowest valuation of a bidder is sufficiently larger than the other bidder's highest valuation.
Proposition 2 is very simple to prove and to interpret. Precisely,
when [3] is satisfied as both types of bidder 2 win the auction with a bid of v 1H ;
(ii) inequality [3] implies v 1H < v 2L and thus from eq.
[1] we obtain
is that in both auctions bidder 2 always wins, thus R S is equal to the expected valuation of the loser, bidder 1, but R F is the high valuation of bidder 1. Notice that any profile of valuations which satisfies [3] belongs to region C.
The case in which λ
Under the assumption λ 1 ¼ λ 2 we find the following interesting result. Proposition 3 Consider the symmetric setting described in Section 3.2.1. Then, by suitably increasing the valuation of each type (but not each valuation by the same amount) we obtain a setting in which the revenue from the FPA is reduced.
An instance in which the result in this proposition is obtained is such that
12 This fact may appear similar to the main message in Cantillon (2008) , but in fact in our analysis the benchmark symmetric setting is fixed, whereas in Cantillon (2008) it is not. 13 Obviously, an analogous result holds if v 1H is kept fixed and v 2H is allowed to vary. 14 Lebrun (1998) considers a setting with continuously distributed valuations and assumes that the valuation distribution of one bidder changes into a new distribution which dominates the previous one in the sense of reverse hazard rate domination (the support is unchanged). He show that, as a consequence, for each bidder the new bid distribution first-order stochastically dominates the initial bid distribution and thus the expected revenue increases.
Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions
Next proposition describes a set of circumstances which imply R S > R F . In doing so, it relies on Lemma 1 and on the fact that the BNE described by Proposition 1(iii) is independent of v 2L , for v 2L 2 ½v 1L ; v 2H Þ. The rest of this section is devoted to discussions and intuitions for these results.
Proposition 4 Suppose that λ 1 ¼ λ 2 ; λ. Then R S > R F if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
In terms of the regions A; B; C introduced in Section 3. reveals that R S is increasing in v 2L and therefore R S > R F .
In case that
, and the previous paragraph explains that an increase in v 2L has no effect on R F , but increases R S . Hence R S > R F still holds.
v 1 more uncertain than v 2 The inequalities in [10] characterize the setting in which v 1 has a wider range of variability than v 2 ; this includes the special case in which v 1 is a mean-preserving-spread of v 2 . In this setting, the ranking between R S and R F is unambiguous: the SPA is better than the FPA when a bidder's valuation is more uncertain than the other bidder's valuation. Vickrey (1961) analyzes a related setting, in which v 1 is uniformly distributed over ½0; 1 and v 2 is common knowledge, equal to a fixed value a; he proves that the FPA is superior to the SPA for a > 0:43. Now consider in our framework the parameters λ ¼ 1=2 and From [11] and [12] we can obtain sufficient conditions for R S > R F , but in fact in the appendix we exploit this particular structure of asymmetry to prove a stronger result:
These results have an immediate interpretation: In our discrete setting a small shift, that is a small α > 0, favors the SPA over the FPA, 22 whereas the result is reversed for a large shift, for instance if [3] is satisfied. On the other
Figure 1: Comparison between the FPA and the SPA when λ ! 1=2. In the dark grey region S ¼ S ðiiÞ¨SðiiiÞ the SPA dominates the FPA in terms of the seller's revenue. In the light grey region F ¼ F ðiÞ¨FðiiÞ the FPA is superior. Proposition 1(i) applies in the north-east set F ðiÞ , 1(ii) in the set F ðiiÞ¨SðiiÞ in the middle and north-west and 1(iii) in the south-west set S ðiiiÞ 21 Maskin and Riley (2000a) prove the same result under slightly stronger assumptions. 22 In fact, we can prove that a small shift reduces R F as it has a zero first-order effect on the bidding of types 1 L ; 2 L ; 2 H , but induces 1 H to bid less aggressively.
hand, in their numeric analysis applied to continuous distributions, Li and Riley (2007) find that a shift "can result in economically very significant revenue differences [in favor of the FPA]" for examples with uniform or truncated normal distributions and claim that "Analysis of other distributions also produces broadly similar results." Our results show that this claim does not hold in a setting with binary supports, and in Section 4.3 we propose an explanation for this fact. 
Relationship with the literature
In order to see why in our discrete setting we obtain different results with respect to the literature mentioned above, it is useful to describe briefly the approach in Kirkegaard (2012a) , which provides the most general theoretical results in favor of the FPA. Kirkegaard (2012a) considers a two-bidder environment with supports ½β 1 ; α 1 for v 1 and ½β 2 ; α 2 for v 2 such that β 1 β 2 and α 1 < α 2 . The c.d.f.s F 1 ; F 2 have no atoms and have continuous and positive densities f 1 ; f 2 in the respective supports; moreover, 1 is ex ante weaker than 2 in the sense that F 2 first-order stochastically dominates F 1 . For each v 2 ½β 1 ; α 1 , it is useful to define rðvÞ as F À1 2 ½F 1 ðvÞ, that is rðvÞ satisfies Prfv 2 rðvÞg ¼ Prfv 1 vg. Since F 2 first-order stochastically dominates F 1 , it follows that rðvÞ ! v. Theorem 1 in Kirkegaard (2012a) Theorem 1 results from a clever application of the mechanism design techniques introduced by Myerson (1981) , which establish that the seller's expected revenue in an auction is the expected virtual valuation of the winning bidder minus the rents of the lowest types β 1 and β 2 of the two bidders. In the SPA bidder 1 wins if and only if v 2 < v 1 . However, [13] and [14] imply that the virtual valuation of 1 is larger than the virtual valuation of 2 when v 1 ¼ v 2 , which suggests that it is profitable to have 1 winning the auction if v 1 ¼ v 2 , or if v 1 is slightly smaller than v 2 . In fact, [13] implies that in the FPA bidder 1 bids higher than 2 for equal valuations. Thus 1 wins when v 2 < k F ðv 1 Þ, for a certain function k F such that v < k F ðvÞ rðvÞ. This suggests that the FPA is more profitable than the SPA, but in fact in some states of the world bidder 1 may be "too aggressive" and win even though his virtual valuation is smaller than the virtual valuation of 2. This makes the comparison between the FPA and the SPA not immediate, but Kirkegaard (2012a) shows that if β 1 ¼ β 2 , then [14] implies that the expected virtual valuation of the winner, conditional on v 1 , is larger in the FPA than in the SPA for each v 1 . If instead β 1 < β 2 , then the latter result may not hold, but the FPA extracts from type β 2 of bidder 2 a higher rent than the SPA, which allows to
The assumptions in Kirkegaard (2012a) obviously rule out our discrete setting, but we may approximate our discrete model using a continuous model and inquire whether it satisfies [13] and [14] . We prove in the appendix that the answer is negative, but it is quite intuitive that if F 1 ; F 2 are continuously differentiable c.d.f.s which approximate well our discrete setting, then the densities f 1 ; f 2 are U-shaped. 25 The results in Kirkegaard (2012b) and in Maskin and Riley (2000a) establishing that the FPA is superior to the SPA hold under the assumption that at least one c.d.f. is concave or convex, and/or logconcave (using these assumptions, Kirkegaard (2012b) proves that [13] and [14] are satisfied). However, these assumptions on the curvature of one or both c.d.f.s are inconsistent with U-shaped densities. Regarding Li and Riley (2007) , the uniform and truncated normal distributions they use for their numeric analysis do not have U-shaped densities (this remark applies also to the example in Vickrey (1961) described in Section 4.2.2), and also several other well-known distributions they may have used do not have U-shaped densities. In a sense, therefore, our article can be interpreted as a robustness check on the standard model and establishes that some common curvature assumptions on the distributions are important for the FPA to be superior to the SPA.
Two extensions
In this section we first examine the case in which the seller can use a reserve price, and then we describe an example with three possible valuations for each bidder.
Reserve prices
In the previous sections, we have studied the FPA and the SPA under the assumption that λ 1 ¼ λ 2 and that there is no reserve price. We have proved that the SPA dominates the FPA unless one bidder is sufficiently stronger than the other. In this section, we show that allowing the seller to use a reserve price delivers an unambiguous result: for any parameter values, the SPA with the optimal reserve price is weakly better than the FPA with the optimal reserve price. 26 Precisely, when one bidder is much stronger than the other it is profitable for the seller to choose a reserve price too high for each type of the weak bidder, and in the resulting one-bidder setting both the FPA and the SPA reduce to a take-it-or-leave-it offer; hence revenue equivalence obtain (Li and Riley (2007) provide the same intuition for a related setting). When instead no bidder is much stronger than the other, the two auctions are equivalent when the optimal reserve price is relatively high, that is if λ is close to 0. But if the optimal reserve price is relatively small, that is if λ is close to 1, then the comparison between the SPA and the FPA reduces to the comparison examined by Proposition 4 under condition [9] , and thus the SPA is superior to the FPA.
27
In the SPA with a reserve price r, a bidder with valuation below r does not participate, but if his valuation is at least r then it is still a weakly dominant strategy for him to bid the own valuation. Thus r has no effect if r < v 1L ; conversely, the object remains unsold if r > maxfv 1H ; v 2H g. Therefore we need to consider values of r in ½v 1L ; maxfv 1H ; v 2H g and the expected revenue given r, 26 We thank one referee for suggesting to investigate the effect of reserve prices. 27 Kirkegaard (2012a) shows that if [13] and [14] are satisfied, then the FPA is superior to the SPA for any common reserve price smaller than α 1 , that is such that it allows participation of some type of the weak bidder. Asymmetric auctions with reserve prices are analyzed, using numerical techniques, also in Gayle and Richard (2008) , Li and Riley (2007) , and Marshall and Schulenberg (2003) . In these papers, introducing a reserve price tipically either makes the SPA superior to the FPA (even though the reverse result holds when there is no reserve price) or reduces the revenue advantage of the FPA over the SPA. The latter results are consistent with our results in this section.
denoted by R S ðrÞ, is equal to the expectation of maxfr; minfv 1 ; v 2 gg1 maxfv 1 ;v 2 g ! r ðv 1 ; v 2 Þ, in which 1 maxfv1;v2g ! r ðv 1 ;
We are interested in finding the reserve price which maximizes R S , and we use R SÃ to denote max r2½v1L;maxfv1H ;v2H g R S ðrÞ.
Proposition 5 establishes that in order to find the optimal reserve price we can restrict our attention to the set fv 2L ; v 1H ; v 2H g. This occurs because, as in a standard symmetric model, an increase in the reserve price (weakly) increases the payment of the types of bidder which participate in the auction, but prevents the participation of each type with valuation below the reserve price. In our discrete setting, this makes R S piecewise increasing but right-discontinuous at
For the FPA with a reserve price r, we find a unique equilibrium outcome for each r 2 ½v 1L ; maxfv 1H ; v 2H g. We denote with R F ðrÞ the expected revenue given r, and we let R FÃ ; max r2½v 1L ;maxfv 1H ;v 2H g R F ðrÞ.
Proposition 6 is analogous to Proposition 5 since an increase in the reserve price induces each type of bidder which participates in the auction to bid more aggressively, but discourages the participation of each type with valuation below the reserve price. This makes R F piecewise increasing but right-discontinuous at
Next proposition describes the comparison between the FPA and the SPA when the seller chooses the optimal reserve price and establishes that the FPA is never superior to the SPA.
When v 1H v 2L it is suboptimal for the seller to choose a reserve price smaller than v 2L , both in the FPA and in the SPA because R F ðrÞ ! r and R S ðrÞ ! r for any r v 2L .
However, for r ! v 2L the two auctions are equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it offer to bidder 2, and therefore they yield the same revenue. When v 2L < v 1H , we show in the appendix that maxfR
An example with three types for each bidder
In Doni and Menicucci (2012a), we consider a setting in which the support for bidder i's valuation is a three-point set, fv iL ; v iM ; v iH g, with 0
We prove that some of the results described in Section 4.2 for binary supports hold also when the supports for the bidders' valuations are three-point sets. For instance, the SPA is superior to the FPA if
for an arbitrary y > 0 and a small α > 0 (in this case v 2 is slightly less variable than 
Here, with respect to the symmetric setting such that v 2L ¼ 10; v 2M ¼ 20; v 2H ¼ 30, the shift is equal to 1.
In the SPA it is simple to evaluate the expected revenue and find R S ¼ 143=9.
In the FPA, we find a BNE characterized by four bids 
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
The complete proof of Proposition 1 is long, mainly because of the proof of essential equilibrium uniqueness. Here we provide a partial proof, in which we verify that (i) if [4] is satisfied, then the strategy profile described by Proposition 1(ii) is a BNE; (ii) if [7] is satisfied, then the strategy profile in Proposition 1(iii) is a BNE.
29

The case in which [4] is satisfied
Suppose that the inequalities in [4] are satisfied, and moreover that v 1L < v 2L .
Then we obtain thatb is such that v 1L <b < minfv 2L ; v 1H g (if v 1L ¼ v 2L , thenb is equal to v 2L , which actually would simplify matters), which implies that the strategies described by Proposition 1(ii) make sense. Now we verify that for each type of each bidder the strategy specified by Proposition 1(ii) is a best reply given the strategies of the two types of the other bidder. We use u ij ðbÞ and p ij ðbÞ to denote the payoff of type i j and his probability to win -respectively -as a function of his bid b, given the strategies of the two types of the other bidder. Notice that p ij ðbÞ ¼ 0 for any b < v 1L and p ij ðbÞ ¼ 1 for any b > b; thus we do not need to consider bids below v 1L or above b. The same remark applies to the BNE described by Proposition 1(iii).
28 In fact, a small shift reduces R F as in the case of binary supports (see footnote 22), mainly because it induces type 1 M to bid less aggressively. 29 We do not provide here the proof for the case in which [3] is satisfied since the BNE in that case is similar to a BNE in Maskin and Riley (2000a) : see footnote 11. Doni and Menicucci (2012a) provide a complete proof.
Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions
Type 1 L . The strategies of types 2 L and 2 H are such that each type of bidder 2 bids at least v 1L with probability one. Therefore, the payoff of 1 L is zero if he bids v 1L as specified by Proposition 1(ii), and it is impossible for him to obtain a positive payoff.
Type 1 H . For any b 2 ðv 1L ; b, the payoff of type 1 H is ðv 1H À bÞ½λ 2 G 2L ðbÞþ ð1 À λ 2 ÞG 2H ðbÞ, which is constant and equal to v 1H À b > 0. If b ¼ v 1L , then 1 H loses against 2 H and loses also against 2 L unless 2 L bids v 1L , in which case 1 H ties with 2 L -an event with probability G 2L ðv 1L Þ. Consider the most favorable case for 1 H , which means that he wins the tie-break against 2 L with probability one (this occurs if v 2L < v 1H ): his expected payoff from bidding v 1L is then ðv 1H À v 1L Þλ 2 G 2L ðv 1L Þ, which turns out to be equal to v 1H À b.
which is constant and equal to λ 1 ðv 2L À v 1L Þ > 0. For bids b in ½b; b we find
Àb , which is decreasing in b, and therefore u 2L ðbÞ > u 2L ðbÞ for any b 2 ðb; b.
Type 2 H . For any b 2 ½b; b, the payoff of type 2 H is ðv
which is constant and equal to v 2H À b > 0. For bids b in ½v 1L ;b we find
, which is increasing in b and therefore u 2H ðbÞ < u 2H ðbÞ for any b 2 ½v 1L ;bÞ.
The case in which [7] is satisfied
Suppose that the inequality in [7] is satisfied. Then G 2H ðv 1L Þ ! 0 in eq.
[8] and we verify that for each type of each bidder the strategy specified by Proposition 1(iii) is a best reply given the strategies of the two types of the other bidder. Let
Type 1 L . The same argument given in the proof above for type 1 L applies.
then 1 H ties with type 2 L and loses against 2 H , unless also 2 H bids v 1L -an event
with probability G 2H ðv 1L Þ. Consider the most favorable case for 1 H , which means that he wins the tie-break against each type of bidder 2 with probability one (this occurs if v 2H < v 1H ): his expected payoff from bidding v 1L is then 
Derivation of R F given the BNE described by Proposition 1
The BNE of Proposition 1(ii) when v 1L < v 2L
We evaluate R F as the difference between the social surplus S F generated by the FPA minus the bidders' rents
Thus, we need to derive S F and U F :
H, is the probability that 1 H wins when he faces type 2 j . In order to derive Prf1 H def 2 L g, for the case that v 1H Þ v 2L , we need to evaluate
In order to derive Prf1 H def 2 H g, for the case that v 1H Þv 2H , we need to evaluate
Now we can evaluate R F :
An expression forb is found by solving eq. [2]:
The BNE of Proposition 1(ii) when v 1L ¼ v 2L (footnote 10)
In order to derive Prf2 H def 1 H g, for the case that v 1H Þv 2H , we need to evaluate
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The BNE in Proposition 1(iii)
For the case that v 1H Þv 2H we need to evaluate Prf1 H def 2 H g, which is equal to
Now we can evaluate R F : 
It is simple to see that both G 1H ðbÞ and G 2H ðbÞ are decreasing with respect to v 1H for any b 2 ðv L ; bÞ, and this implies that 1 H and 2 H are both more aggressive, in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, the larger is v 1H in ðv L ; v H . 31 Given that
we infer that R F is increasing in v 1H . 
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof when [9] or [10] is satisfied
The proofs for these results are provided in the text.
The proof when [11] is satisfied
Since R S > R F when [9] is satisfied and R S and R F are continuous functions of the
The proof when [12] is satisfied
Recall from our final remark in Section 3.2.2 that in the BNE described by Proposition 1(ii) the highest valuation bidder does not always win. Conversely, the efficient allocation is always achieved in the SPA. Therefore a sufficient condition for R S > R F is that the aggregate bidders' rents in the FPA, 
On the other hand, the bidders' rents in the SPA are
For valuations in region C, that is such that v 1L < v 1H < v 2L < v 2H , we show that U F ! U S if [12] is satisfied. As above, the bidders' rents in the FPA
, and the inequality U F ! U S reduces to
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We prove that this inequality holds for each
verifying that the left-hand side of [18] is positive both at v 2L ¼ v 1H and at 
Proof for the case of distribution shift
In the case of shift, 
In order for this inequality to be satisfied by an α larger than v 1H À v 1L it is necessary that λ > 2=5.
Proof of the claim in Section 4.3 about the approximation of our discrete setting using a continous model
Suppose that v 1L < v 2L and considerv such that v 1L <v < minfv 2L ; v 1H g; let ε > 0 be close to zero. If F 1 ; F 2 are continuously differentiable c.d.f.s which approximate well our discrete setting, then F 1 ðvÞ > λ À ε, f 1 ðvÞ < ε, F 2 ðvÞ < ε, and F 2 ðrðvÞÞ > λ À ε by definition of rðvÞ. We show that [14] is violated at v ¼v by deriving a contradiction if the inequality f 1 ðvÞ ! f 2 ðxÞ holds for each x 2 ½v; rðvÞ.
Indeed, if this condition were satisfied then F 2 ½rðvÞ ¼ F 2 ðvÞ þ Ð rðvÞ v f 2 ðxÞdx < F 2 ðvÞ þ εðrðvÞ ÀvÞ < εð1 þ rðvÞ ÀvÞ, but we know that F 2 ðrðvÞÞ > λ À ε.
32 In other terms, f 1 ðvÞ needs to be small forv 2 ðv 1L ; v 1H Þ, and [14] requires that f 2 ðxÞ is smaller than f 1 ðvÞ for any x betweenv and rðvÞ. But sincev < v 2L , it is necessary that F 2 grows substantially in ½v; rðvÞ, which is impossible given that f 2 is small.
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Proof of Proposition 5
The expression of R S ðrÞ depends as follows on 
Proof of Proposition 6
Step Step 2 If v 2L < v 1H , then the optimal reserve price in the FPA belongs to fv 2L ; v 1H ; v 2H g.
The result follows from Steps 2.1 and 2.2 below.
Step 2. Hence the optimal r in ðv 2L ; v iH belongs to fv iH ; v jH g ¼ fv 1H ; v 2H g: ■ Notice that when v 1L ¼ v 2L , Step 2.1 implies immediately that the optimal r belongs to fv 2L ; v 1H ; v 2H g. Therefore in the following of the proof, we assume that v 1L < v 2L :
Step 2.2 If we consider only values of r in ½v 1L ; v 2L , then the optimal r is v 2L :
Given r 2 ½v 1L ; v 2L , we need to consider two cases: v 1H v 2H and v 1H > v 2H .
Step 2.2. 
Sinceb is the smaller solution to eq.
[20] and the left-hand side in eq.
[20] is increasing in r, it follows thatb is increasing in r and also b is so. Hence, it is immediate that an increase in r induces both types 2 L and 2 H to bid more aggressively. The same result holds for type 1 H as well since 
